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An Examination of Trans Fat Labeling:
Splitting the Third & Ninth Circuit
Jack Gainey *
Abstract
At first glance, consumer claims alleging misleading labeling
would seem to find a simple resolution. Under 21 U.S.C. § 343,
which governs misbranded food, a food product is misbranded if
“its labeling is false or misleading.” 1 However, controversial
interpretation of seemingly straightforward statutory language,
together with evolving case law, have blurred a once clear picture.
Disagreement over the federal preemption of consumer claims
regarding trans fat, underscored by a dispute regarding standing,
have combined to create a divergence of opinions between courts
across the country.
In 2011, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California considered a class action trans fat
misbranding claim alleging that a food manufacturer had
deceptively labeled certain ice cream products as containing zero
grams of trans fat even though the products contained partially
hydrogenated oil, a source of trans fat. 2 The district court found
that the class of consumers had standing to bring a trans fat
misbranding claim. 3 However, the district court ultimately
dismissed the case, holding that the trans fat misbranding claims
were preempted by federal law. 4 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
later affirmed the district court’s dismissal on federal preemption
grounds. 5 In 2015, the Ninth Circuit returned to the issue in a
* Candidate for J.D., May 2017, Washington and Lee University School of
Law.
1. 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1) (2017).
2. Carrea v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., No. C 10-01044 JSW, 2011 WL
159380, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011).
3. Id. at *2–*3.
4. Id. at *4.
5. Carrea v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., 475 Fed. App’x 113, 115 (9th
Cir. 2012).
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different case, but this time it reached the opposite conclusion,
holding that claims by consumers alleging that a “No Trans Fat”
label was misleading as applied to a product containing partiallyhydrogenated oil were not preempted by federal law. 6
The Third Circuit on the other hand, dismissed a similar
consumer protection claim. 7 In Young, products that contained
trans fat but stated, “NO TRANS FAT, directly above a symbol of a
heart to convey heart health” were found not to be misleading. 8 The
Third Circuit pronounced that the consumer’s claims were
contradicted by both FDA regulations governing trans fats, as well
as disclosures made on the product’s own packaging. 9 The FDA
requires that fat levels of less than 0.5 grams per serving shall be
expressed as zero. 10 Thus, the Third Circuit determined that
because the product in question contained less than 0.5 grams of
trans fat per serving, the manufacturer’s “claims that [their
product] contains ‘NO TRANS FAT’ and ‘No Trans Fatty Acids’
[were] consistent with FDA regulations.” 11
The part of the label, and the substance that courts choose
to apply the FDA regulation to, drastically changes the meaning
and impact of the regulation. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation is
supported by logic and a greater weight of evidence. Warning letters
issued by the FDA, overturned cases relied on by the Third Circuit,
and the structure and text of the regulations all reinforce the Ninth
Circuit’s decision.

6. See Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, 780 F.3d 952, 959–63 (9th Cir. 2015)
(considering whether a plaintiff’s claim that a “No Trans Fat” label was
misleading as used to describe a product containing partially-hydrogenated
vegetable oil, which contains trans fats, was preempted under federal law).
7. See Young v. Johnson & Johnson, No. CIV.A. 11-4580 JAP, 2012 WL
1372286, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 19, 2012) (discussing the granting of Johnson &
Johnson’s motion to dismiss), aff’d, 525 F. App’x 179 (3d Cir. 2013).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(c)(2)(ii) (2016).
11. See Young, 2012 WL 1372286, at *3–*5 (explaining why Benecol’s claims
were consistent with FDA regulations).
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I. Introduction
Food labeling has seen an increased level of consideration and
scrutiny due to “dietary-related diseases” and consumer trends
showing an increased interest in nutrition. 12 The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) currently has authority over food labeling. 13
The FDA traces its origins to public concern over Upton Sinclair’s
best-selling novel The Jungle, which exposed unsanitary
conditions in the American meat-packing industry. 14
The early twentieth century saw an unprecedented expansion
in the regulation of food safety, which led to many laws aimed at
protecting consumers. 15 Another wave of consumer protection laws
12. See Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Litigation to Address Misleading Food Label
Claims and the Role of the State Attorneys General, 26 REGENT U.L. REV. 421, 421
(2014) (“The increased global prevalence of diet-related diseases, such as diabetes,
heart disease, and cancer, elevates the importance of truthful and accurate
nutrition information in the marketplace.”).
13. See 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2012) (explaining national uniform nutrition
labeling).
14. See generally UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (Dover 2001) (1906).
15. See generally Spencer Weber Waller et al., Consumer Protection in the
United States: An Overview, 2011 EUR. J. OF CONS. L. 803 (2011).
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were passed in the 1960’s under both President Kennedy and
President Johnson. 16 Complex consumer protection laws now exist
at both the state and federal level. 17
The duty of protecting consumers is dispersed through
different channels. Many states charge their attorney generals
with enforcing their consumer protection laws, while consumers
have the right to bring common law tort claims, statutory causes
of action, and class actions. 18 The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) empowers the FDA to “protect the public health by
ensuring that . . . foods are safe, wholesome, sanitary, and properly
labeled.” 19 The FDA’s standard for whether a food product is
misbranded is if the labeling is “false or misleading in any
particular.” 20 False and deceptive advertising claims are fertile
ground for consumer protection litigation. 21
Trans fat has become a heavily litigated issue in the realm of
consumer protection. Consumers claim that manufacturers
misrepresent their products by deceptively labeling trans fat. 22
Courts have struggled particularly with the statutes and
regulations that govern the disclosure of trans fat in food
products. 23 These products are required by regulation to have a
16. See id. (explaining the progression of consumer protection laws).
17. See id. (“The result is that American consumers are protected from
unsafe products, fraud, deceptive advertising, and unfair business practices
through a mixture of national, state, and local governmental laws and the
existence of many private rights of actions.”).
18. See id. (explaining the different private rights of action for consumers).
19. What
Does
FDA
Do?,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194877.htm (last visited
Apr. 18, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 343(a) (2012).
21. See Pomeranz, supra note 12, at 423 (“As a result of outdated regulations
and lax enforcement, the initiation of private lawsuits has escalated.”).
22. See Carrea v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., No. C 10-01044 JSW, 2011
WL 159380, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011) (“Plaintiff . . . [alleges] that the ‘0g
Trans Fat’ statements displayed on the product packaging and in marketing
materials are false and misleading as allegedly determined by the FDA”), aff’d,
475 F. App’x 113 (9th Cir. 2012); Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, 780 F.3d 952, 955–
57 (9th Cir. 2015) (describing the underlying claim by a consumer that a “No
Trans Fat” label found on a margarine product was unlawfully misleading
because the product did contain trans fats).
23. See Reid, 780 F.3d at 960 (“FDA regulations specifically address trans
fat. They provide that trans fat should generally be disclosed in the nutrition
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straightforward statement of the number of grams of trans fat per
serving. 24 However, that same regulation mandates “[t]rans fat
content shall be indented and expressed as grams per serving to
the nearest 0.5 (1/2)-gram increment . . . . If the serving contains
less than 0.5 gram, the content, when declared, shall be expressed
as zero.” 25 The difference in regulations governing claims inside
the nutrition label, as opposed to nutrient content claims outside
the label have also caused confusion.
Consumers across the country have brought class action
lawsuits against manufacturers alleging their product packaging
contains misrepresentations. In 2014, The Quaker Oats Company
paid $1.4 million to settle a class action lawsuit alleging that
Chewy Granola Bars were “deceptively labeled” as having 0 grams
of trans fat, but in fact contained the substance. 26 About fifty
different flavors of Quaker products were involved in this class
action. Quaker also agreed to injunctive relief which removed
partially hydrogenated oils that contained trans fat from those
products. 27
Courts have disagreed over whether these consumers have
standing to sue. 28 Other courts that decided these cases on the
merits, disagreed over whether these claims are preempted or
not. 29 Some courts have denied standing, reasoning that,
“apprehension about a possible future injury [is] insufficient to
establish injury-in-fact” 30 Other courts have decided that a
plaintiff’s financial loss in paying more for a supposedly healthy
product can establish the injury-in-fact element of standing. 31
label . . . ” (citing 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(c)(2) (2016))).
24. 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(c)(2)(ii) (2016).
25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. Rose Bouboushian, Quaker Oats to Pay $1.4M to Settle Class Action,
COURTHOUSE
NEWS
SERV.
(July
31,
2014,
11:48
AM),
http://www.courthousenews.com/quaker-oats-to-pay-1-4m-to-settle-class-action/
(last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
27. Id.
28. Young v. Johnson & Johnson, No. CIV.A. 11-4580 JAP, 2012 WL
1372286, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 19, 2012), aff’d, 525 F. App’x 179 (3d Cir. 2013).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Askin v. Quaker Oats Co., 818 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1084 (N.D. Ill. 2011)
(“[M]embers of the class did not suffer physical injury, but it does not mean that
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On the preemption issue, some courts have decided these
claims are preempted because the manufacturer statements
complied with FDA regulations. 32 Other courts have decided that
because the FDA extends specific preemption protections to claims
about fat, and those protections were specifically not extended to
trans fats, it would be “incongruous” for the FDA regulations to
preempt trans fat claims. 33
The Third Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have come to different
conclusions on whether consumer claims regarding trans fat
labeling should be preempted or allowed. 34 That circuit split, and
other similar cases will be explored below en route to a proposed
answer to the question of whether these consumer claims
regarding trans fat labeling should be preempted. 35
Section II(a) will outline what trans fats are and the impact
they have. Section II(b) offers an in depth look at the statutory
background involved in these consumer protection issues. Section
II(c) discusses the federal preemption of labeling regulations.
Section III(a) examines how the Ninth Circuit originally decided
these claims were preempted, and then recently reversed that
decision. Section III(b) scrutinizes the Third Circuit’s decision that
consumer claims regarding trans fat labeling should be preempted.
Section III(c) analyzes how other courts outside of the Third and
Ninth have dealt with similar issues. Finally, Section IV will
conclude this examination with a resolution to this complex issue.

they were uninjured. The plaintiffs’ loss is financial: they paid more for the toys
than they would have, had they known of the risks the beads posed to children. A
financial injury creates standing.”).
32. Carrea v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., No. C 10-01044 JSW, 2011 WL
159380, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011).
33. See, e.g., Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, 780 F.3d 952, 962–63 (9th Cir.
2015) (explaining that interpreting FDA regulations to allow “No Trans Fat”
labelling, despite a lack of scientific consensus on the dangers of trans fat, would
not be consistent with other similar labelling restrictions).
34. See generally id.; Young v. Johnson & Johnson, No. CIV.A. 11-4580 JAP,
2012 WL 1372286, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 19, 2012) aff’d, 525 F. App’x 179 (3d Cir.
2013).
35. Id.
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II. Background
A. Trans Fat and its Impact
Trans Fats “are formed during the partial hydrogenation of
vegetable oils, a process that converts vegetable oils into semi-solid
fats for use in margarines, commercial cooking and manufacturing
processes.” 36 Food producers have increasingly used trans fat over
the last fifteen years due to its cost effective nature 37 and long shelf
life. 38 Trans fat has stability during deep-frying, and a
“semisolid[]” consistency which, “can be customized to enhance the
palatability of baked goods and sweets.” 39 Artificially produced
trans fat makes up about two to three percent of a consumers “total
calories consumed.” 40 Naturally occurring trans fat, makes up
around 0.5 percent of total caloric intake for the average
consumer. 41 The drawback of trans fat comes from the health risks
associated with the product. 42
Many private and government studies “suggest a link between
trans fat consumption and serious, negative health effects such as
heart disease, diabetes and cancer.” 43 One of the major heart
health concerns is the increase of bad cholesterol from trans fat:
The major risk posed by trans fats is that they raise low
density lipoprotein (LDL or bad) cholesterol in the blood.
An elevated LDL cholesterol increases the risk of
36. See Dariush Mozaffarian et al., Trans Fatty Acids and Cardiovascular
Disease, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1601 (2006) (explaining the properties of trans
fat).
37. See Christopher L. Burrell, Note, Co-Signing Danger: Why the FDA
Should Tighten Regulations on the Use of Trans Fat in Foods in Order To Limit
Its Adverse Effects on the Health of Low-Income African-Americans, 3 S. REGIONAL
BLACK L. STUDENTS ASS’N L.J. 1, 1 (2009) (“Trans fat has proven to be cost
effective, as it increases the shelf life of products and decreases the need for
refrigeration.”).
38. Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., 752 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1115 (N.D. Cal.
2010).
39. Mozaffarian, supra note 36, at 1601.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Chacanaca, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (citing studies proffered by the
plaintiff which support a link between consumption of trans fat and negative
health consequences).
43. Id.
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developing coronary heart disease (CHD). Trans fat also
lowers HDL-C [high-density lipoprotein or good
cholesterol] and impair[s] FMD [flowed-mediated
vasodilation]. This suggests that [trans fats] increase the
risk of CHD more than the intake of saturated fats, with
similar effects on LDL cholesterol. 44

Some countries have gone as far as restricting the use of trans fat
in food products. 45 As many as five European countries are on the
road to banning trans fat through regulations, while many more
have scaled back their consumption using self-regulatory
mechanisms. 46
In 2013, the FDA made a determination that these partially
hydrogenated oils were no longer generally recognized as safe for
any use in human food. 47 The FDA only now claims that it has
taken steps to remove artificial trans fat from processed food
entirely, within the next three years. 48 This three year “compliance
period” began in June 2015. 49 Even with these new regulations,
trans fat will still make its way into our diet. 50 The FDA admits
that trans fat will not be completely gone, “because [trans fat] also
occurs naturally in meat and dairy products.” 51 Companies can
also petition the FDA for trans fat exemptions for specific uses. 52
44. Andrew J. VanLandingham, The Awful Taste of Partially Hydrogenated
Vegetable Oil: A Recommendation That Indiana Ban Trans Fats from
Restaurants, 6 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 325, 330 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).
45. See Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., 752 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1115 (N.D. Cal.
2010) (accepting plaintiff’s assertion that certain nations throughout the world
have restricted or banned the use of products with trans fat).
46. See Europe Leads the World in Eliminating Trans Fat, WORLD HEALTH
ORG.,
http://www.euro.who.int/en/media-centre/sections/pressreleases/2014/europe-leads-the-world-in-eliminating-trans-fats (last visited Apr.
18, 2017) (“Denmark, Austria, Hungary, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland have
set similar limits that virtually ban trans fats from food products, but
consumption remains high where no policies are in place”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
47. FDA Cuts Trans Fat in Processed Foods, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm372915.htm
(last
visited Apr. 18, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights
and Social Justice) (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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Trans fat bans on local levels have had a positive health
impact. 53 In 2007, New York City forced restaurants to stop using
partially hydrogenated oils. 54 A study in 2012 examined lunch
receipts, collected from fast-food chains before and after the ban
went into effect, and trans fat consumption dropped by 2.5 grams
per meal. 55
From a policy standpoint, it has been argued that poor
African-Americans are impacted at a greater rate by trans fat
“because African-Americans are more likely than other
populations to rely on cheaper food produced through unhealthy
processing methods.” 56 One example of how poor AfricanAmericans are more vulnerable to unhealthy food can be seen in
the disbursement of fast-food restaurants in lower-income
neighborhoods. 57 This bears “a direct correlation to higher
incidence of obesity.” 58 Trans fat also impacts this community
disproportionately in the following ways:
Conditions such as hypertension, diabetes, and high cholesterol
are widespread in the African-American community and are
made worse by trans fat. When coupled with the fact that poor
African-Americans may not understand nutrition labels, cannot
afford higher priced products, and may live in fast food
dominated neighborhoods, it becomes clear that they are
particularly vulnerable to the effects of trans fat. Thus, greater
measures are needed to better protect them as consumers. 59

53. See Amanda MacMillan, NYC’s Fat Ban Paying Off, CNN (July 16, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/16/health/nyc-fat-ban-paying-off (last visited Apr.
18, 2017) (concluding that the reduced consumption due to the restrictions on
trans fat is increasing the health of its citizens) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Burrell, supra note 37.
57. See id. at 12 (describing a 2005 study that showed that 72% of the
restaurants in South Los Angeles were fast food restaurants compared to only
41% of restaurants in West Los Angeles, a more affluent neighborhood (citing
ANNIE PARK ET AL., CMTY. HEALTH COUNCILS, SOUTH LOS ANGELES HEALTH EQUITY
SCORECARD (2008))).
58. See id. (noting, from the same 2005 data, that 30% of South Los Angeles
residents were obese compared to only 19.1% in the greater metropolitan area
and only 14.1% in West Los Angeles).
59. Id.
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B. Statutes & Regulations Involved in Trans Fat Labeling

The Nutrition Labeling Education Act (NLEA), which
amended the FDCA, was signed into law by President George H.W.
Bush and allowed for greater regulation of nutritional claims. 60
The NLEA authorized the FDA to require ingredient disclosure. 61
Legislative history informs us that there were two distinct reasons
for the NLEA. The first was to “establish uniform national
standards for the nutritional claims and the required nutrient
information displayed on food labels.” 62 Second, the NLEA sought
to ensure that any state law “requirement for nutrition labeling of
foods that is not identical to the requirements” of the NLEA is
preempted. 63
21 U.S.C. § 343 governs misbranded food. 64 Under § 343(a)(1),
a food product will be misbranded if “its labeling is false or
misleading.” 65 Together § 343(q) and § 343(r) “regulate the
information that goes into the ‘nutrition box’ section on all
packaged products [as well as] nutrient content claims that appear
elsewhere on the label.” 66 There is an important distinction
between nutrient content claims and information that is declared
on the nutrition label. 67 “Information that is required or permitted
to be declared in nutrition labeling, and that appears as part of the
nutrition label, is not a nutrient content claim and is not subject”
to the same requirements. 68 When the information in the nutrition
label is placed elsewhere on the item, it then becomes a nutrient
content claim, which is subject to a different set of regulations. 69
The cases involved in the circuit split center mostly around
60. Pomeranz, supra note 12, at 422.
61. See id. at 422–23 (explaining how the NLEA expanded the scope of the
FDCA in relation to misleading labeling claims).
62. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-538, at 12 (1990) (explaining the reasons the
NLEA was authorized).
63. Id. at 8.
64. 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2012).
65. 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1) (2012).
66. Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., 752 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1117 (N.D. Cal.
2010).
67. 21 C.F.R. § 101.13(c) (2016).
68. Id.
69. Id.
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nutrient content claims that appear outside of the nutritional
label. 70
An express nutrient content claim is a claim that makes a
“direct statement about the level (or range) of a nutrient in the
food, e.g., ‘low sodium’ or ‘contains 100 calories.’” 71 An implied
nutrient content claim indirectly describes the contents of a
product and can occur in one of two ways. 72 The first is when a
claim “[d]escribes the food or an ingredient therein in a manner
that suggests that a nutrient is absent or present in a certain
amount (e.g., ‘high in oat bran’).” 73 The second way is when a claim
“[s]uggests that the food, because of its nutrient content, may be
useful in maintaining healthy dietary practices and is made in
association with an explicit claim or statement about a nutrient
(e.g., ‘healthy, contains 3 grams (g) of fat’).” 74
Federal regulations state these nutrient content claims cannot
be made on a products label, unless they are in accordance with
governing regulations. 75 For example, a nutrient content claim
cannot be two times the size of the product’s statement of
identity. 76 A product’s statement of identity is the common or usual
name for the product, such as “milk” on a milk carton. 77 See Figure
1 below for an example of Benecol’s nutrient content claim. 78 On
the bottom left of the front of the label there is a symbol of a heart,
and the words, “NO TRANS FAT” are placed above the heart. 79
70. See Young v. Johnson & Johnson, 525 F. App’x 179, 180–81 (3d Cir. 2013)
(describing two claims made outside of the nutrition box).
71. 21 C.F.R. § 101.13(a)–(b) (2016).
72. See id. § 101.13(b) (“A claim that expressly or implicitly characterizes the
level of a nutrient of the type required to be in nutrition labeling under 101.9 or
under 101.36 . . . may not be made on the label or in labeling of the food. . . .”).
73. Id.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id.
76. See id. § 101.13(f) (“A nutrient content claim shall be in type size no
larger than two times the statement of identity and shall not be unduly prominent
in type style compared to the statement of identity.”).
77. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.3 (2016) (providing information on food packaging
labels).
78. Benecol
55%
Vegetable
Oil
Spread,
GIANT
EAGLE,
http://www.gianteagle.com/300450839183.aspx (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
79. Id.
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Figure 1 80

C. Federal Preemption of Trans Fat Labeling Regulations
Federal preemption of state laws dates back to the early
history of the United States. 81 Federal laws reign supreme over
those of the states in certain situations due to the Supremacy
80. Id.
81. See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 427 (1819) (“It is of the very
essence of supremacy, to remove all obstacles to its action within its own sphere,
and so to modify every power vested in subordinate governments, as to exempt
its own operations from their own influence.”).
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Clause. 82 Preemption occurs when, “(1) Congress enacts a statute
that explicitly preempts state law; (2) state law actually conflicts
with federal law; or (3) federal law occupies a legislative field to
such an extent that it is reasonable to conclude that Congress left
no room for state regulation in that field.” 83 In areas of traditional
state regulation there is a presumption against preemption unless
Congress has clearly manifested its intent to do so. 84
The reason federal preemption is a recurring issue in these
cases is because of the way that Congress amended the FDCA. 85
The NLEA added a preemption provision to the FDCA which
expressly preempts “state laws addressing certain subjects
[including labeling requirements] that are ‘not identical to’ various
standards set forth by the FDCA . . . .” 86 Federal preemption is an
affirmative defense in these cases. 87 The Defendants attempt to
show that “an FDCA regulation [or NLEA amendment] governs
the labeling claim.” 88
However, claims will not be preempted if the regulation is not
found to govern trans fat. 89 In Reid, the Ninth Circuit said to this
point, “[i]t would be incongruous to have the same rule for both ‘No
Fat’ . . . and ‘No Trans Fat’ claims, as the former is expressly
permitted while the latter is not due to a lack of scientific
consensus about the dangers of trans fat. 90
82. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
83. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
84. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (“Congress
added the remainder of the provision is evidence of its intent to draw a distinction
between state labeling requirements that are pre-empted and those that are
not.”).
85. See Lam v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1102 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(discussing the FDCA and the NLEA).
86. Id.
87. See Trazo v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-2272 PSG, 2013 WL 4083218,
at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2013) (“It is imperative to note, however, that preemption
is an affirmative defense, not an element of Plaintiffs’ claims”), reconsideration
granted, No. 5:12-CV-02272-PSG, 2015 WL 4196973 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2015).
88. Id.
89. See generally Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, 780 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir.
2015).
90. See id. (“Thus, the FDA’s reading of section 101.13(i)(3)—that the
regulation does not authorize ‘No Trans Fat’ claims—makes the most sense of the
overall labeling regime . . . .”).
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III. Analysis of the Circuit Split between the Ninth and
Third Circuit
A. Ninth Circuit Decisions

In 2012, Carrea v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. 91 was
decided by the Ninth Circuit. 92 Carrea involved a consumer
protection claim surrounding a manufacturer’s product that stated
it contained “0 g Trans Fat.” 93 Importantly, a “premium price” was
charged for the product, above that of similar products. 94 The
Plaintiff claimed he was only willing to pay that premium price
because he believed the higher priced products were better than
other frozen dessert products due to
the
alleged
95
misrepresentations.
The District Court decided these allegations satisfied the
injury-in-fact requirement necessary to pursue claims under
California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), 96 False Advertising
Law (FAL), 97 and the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act
(CLRA). 98 The UCL states that: “unfair competition shall mean
and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or
practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading
advertising . . . .” 99 The FAL states it is unlawful to make any
statement “which [is] untrue or misleading, and which is known,
or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be
untrue or misleading . . . with the intent not to sell that personal

91. 475 F. App’x 113 (9th Cir. 2012).
92. Id.
93. See Carrea v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., No. C 10-01044 JSW, 2011
WL 159380, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011) (describing the allegation that
Defendant charges a premium price for its ice cream products based on
“misrepresentations that they contain original ingredients and zero grams of
trans fat.”).
94. Id.
95. See id. (explaining Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant charged a
premium price based on a misrepresentation, satisfying an injury in fact
requirement showing grounds for possible standing).
96. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2016).
97. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2016).
98. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750 (West 2016).
99. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2016).
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property or those services . . . as so advertised.” 100 The CLRA
includes a list of twenty plus proscribed practices, one of which is
“[u]sing deceptive representations”. 101
The Defendant in Carrea challenged the claims made under
state law on the premise that they impose requirements that are
“’not identical to’ the requirements set forth in regulations
promulgated by the Food and Drug Administration . . . and are
therefore expressly preempted pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act . . . as amended by the Nutrition Labeling and
Education Act . . . .”102 The regulation at issue expressly requires
that “if the serving contains less than 0.5 gram, the content, when
declared, shall be expressed as zero.” 103 The Defendant reasoned
that “a statement about the amount or percentage of a nutrient [is
permitted] if [t]he statement does not in any way implicitly
characterize the level of the nutrient in the food and it is not false
or misleading in any respect . . . .” 104
District Judge Jeffrey S. White, who wrote the opinion in
Carrea, first discussed recent decisions that involved preemption
due to the federal regulatory statute. 105 Specifically he focused on
Chacanaca, which involved the labeling of granola bars that
contained “0 Grams Trans Fat” statements. 106 Judge White was
building a foundation to ultimately declare Carrea’s claims were
preempted and reminded the parties that “[i]n Chacanaca, the
Court determined that [federal regulations did] preempt . . . state
or local governments from imposing any requirement on nutrient
content claims . . . not identical to the requirement of section
343(r).” 107 Title 21 U.S.C. § 343(r) governs nutrient content claims
that manufacturers choose to include on a “food label or package,
100. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2016).
101. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770 (West 2016); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750 (West 2016).
102. Carrea v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., No. C 10-01044 JSW, 2011 WL
159380, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011).
103. 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(c)(2) (2016).
104. Carrea, 2011 WL 159380, at *3 (internal quotations omitted).
105. See id. (“Several recent District Court decisions have held that claims
based on statements concerning nutrient content, or using terms that the FA has
defined or permitted, are preempted by the federal statute.”).
106. See id. at *4 (explaining that the court in Chacanaca preempted any
state or local government from imposing nutrient content claims requirements
made by food purveyors).
107. Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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that is, a claim that expressly or by implication . . . characterizes
the relationship of any nutrient required by [section 343(q)(1) or
(2)] to be in the label.” 108 An accompanying regulation provides
that “[i]f such information is declared [outside of the nutrition
label] . . . it is a nutrient content claim and is subject to the
requirements for nutrient content claims.” 109At the District Court
level in Carrea, the Chacanaca preemption reasoning cited by
Judge White above won the day. 110
In 2012, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the
district court in Carrea. 111 The court found that the Plaintiff’s
claims regarding the “0g Trans Fat” statement were expressly
preempted by the FDCA as amended by the NLEA. 112 The Court
decided that the statement was “an express nutrient content claim
that the [FDA] not only permits . . . but further instructs should
mirror the Nutrition Facts panel.” 113
On March 13, 2015, the Ninth Circuit, in Reid v. Johnson &
Johnson, 114 reversed a district court decision and ruled that a class
action group of consumers were not preempted by the NLEA in
their claims that the manufacturer’s vegetable oil based spread
contained misrepresentations in violation of California’s unfair
competition law, false advertising law, and consumer legal
remedies act. 115 This decision in March 2015 created the circuit
split between the Ninth and Third Circuit. The history of Reid is
important to understanding how the Ninth Circuit changed its
opinion on the preemption of these claims. 116
108. Id. (internal citations omitted).
109. Id. at *4 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
110. See Carrea v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., No. C 10-01044 JSW, 2011
WL 159380, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011) (“Adopting the reasoning of
Chacanaca, the Court concludes that the ‘0g Trans Fat’ statement on Defendant’s
Drumsticks packaging, outside the Nutrition Facts box, is a nutrient content
claim subject to the express preemption provision of the NLEA.”).
111. Carrea v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., 475 F. App’x 113, 115 (9th Cir.
2012).
112. Id.
113. Id. (internal citations omitted).
114. 780 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2015).
115. Id. at 963.
116. See Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 11CV1310 L BLM, 2012 WL
4108114, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2012) (discussing the defendant’s product and
the reason for plaintiff’s claim).
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The defendants in Reid, Johnson & Johnson, and its
subsidiary, McNeil Nutritionals, LLC, manufacture a product
called Benecol. 117 Benecol’s website claims “Our spreads are ideal
substitutes for traditional butter and margarines.” 118 The
vegetable-oil-based spread has the following statements on its
labels: “Proven to Reduce Cholesterol; No Trans Fat; No Trans
Fatty Acids.” 119 The Plaintiff contended that these claims were
false because Benecol actually contains small amounts of trans
fat. 120 The Plaintiff also claimed the product was misbranded
because it contained unauthorized nutrient content claims. 121
The District Court reasoned that the Plaintiff was merely
seeking to distinguish, “No Trans Fat” and “No Trans Fatty Acids”
on the Benecol packaging from “0g trans fat” or “0 grams trans fat”
seen in Carrea, where the consumers’ claims were dismissed. 122
The District Court did not agree that this distinction should result
in a different outcome than Carrea, calling it unreasonable and
thus finding the trans fat claims expressly preempted by the
NLEA. 123
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit approached the question in Reid
by establishing the determination of the Plaintiff’s “No Trans Fat”
claim would turn on whether the statement is authorized by FDA
regulations governing express nutrient claims. 124 The court first
determined that the trans fat statements on the Benecol packaging
were express claims because they were direct statements about the
117. Id.
118. See Our Food Range, BENECOL, http://www.benecol.ie/web/benecol.ie/
our-food-range/spreads (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (detailing the variety of
spreads available as alternatives to butter or margarine) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
119. Reid, 2012 WL 4108114, at *1.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id. at *10 (“[P]laintiff is attempting to distinguish ‘0g trans fat’ or ‘0
grams trans fat’, which the FDA permits under 21 C.F.R. § 101.13(i)(3), with
Defendants’ labeled Benecol’s trans fat content, ‘No Trans Fat’ and ‘No Trans
Fatty Acids’, thereby avoiding express preemption.”).
123. See id. (“Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s trans fat claims are
expressly preempted by the NLEA.”).
124. See Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, 780 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The
preemption analysis of the ‘No Trans Fat’ claim turns on whether the statement
is authorized by FDA regulations.”).
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amount of trans fat in the product. 125 The court reasoned that FDA
regulations would only allow express claims that “do not in any
way implicitly characterize the level of the nutrient in the food and
[are] not false or misleading in any respect.” 126
In deciding if these claims were authorized and thus
preempted, the court turned its focus to warning letters issued by
the FDA. 127 Specifically, the court examined the guidance that the
FDA has given on whether a “No Trans Fat” nutrient content claim
is allowed when products actually contain small amounts of trans
fat. 128 The first letter stated, “‘No Trans Fat’ is ‘an unauthorized
nutrient content claim.’” 129 Next, the court noted that a second
letter from the FDA specifically stated “trans fat-free” is an
“unauthorized nutrient content claim.” 130
Regarding the binding impact of those letters, the court noted
they are only one of many enforcement measures the FDA uses to
police labels, but ultimately are merely informal and advisory. 131
The FDA uses these letters to try and obtain voluntary changes
from manufactures, with what it considers to be violations of the
FDCA or NLEA. 132 The Ninth Circuit further stated that these
letters or agency interpretations, whether informal or not, should
be controlling unless they are clearly erroneous. 133 Following that
principle, and believing the letters were not clearly erroneous, the
Ninth Circuit chose to defer to the FDA’s interpretation that the
claims on the packaging were not allowed and thus the Plaintiff’s
claims were not preempted. 134 An additional reason for the Ninth
Circuit’s decision on the preemption issue was that, “[a] nutrient
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id. (“The FDA has provided guidance about whether a ‘No Trans Fat’
nutrient content claim is permissible for products containing small amounts of
trans fat.”).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 962 n.5.
132. Id.
133. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (explaining how the court
gives deference to the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation unless it is deemed
clearly erroneous).
134. Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, 780 F.3d 952, 962–63 (9th Cir. 2015).
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content claim fails if it is false or misleading in any respect.
Because Benecol contains some trans fat (between 0 and 0.5 grams
per serving), its ‘No Trans Fat’ claim is misleading in at least one
respect.” 135
The structure and language of FDA labeling regulations
reinforce the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the Plaintiff’s claims
should not be preempted. 136 The FDA expressly allows “‘No Fat’
and ‘No Saturated Fat’ claims for products that contain less than
0.5 grams of fat or saturated fat per serving.” On the other hand,
“No Trans Fat” claims were given the opposite treatment, and not
authorized due to a lack of scientific information. 137
The Ninth Circuit reasoned “if section 101.13(i)(3) authorizes
‘No Fat’ and ‘No Saturated Fat’ claims for products with small
amounts of fat or saturated fat, then why would the FDA go to the
trouble of promulgating a separate regulation expressly allowing
these claims?” 138 The Defendant’s interpretation would make
several regulations redundant. 139 It would be inconsistent logic by
the FDA to have the same regulation for Fat and Trans Fat claims
because fat claims are expressly permitted, while trans fat claims
are not permitted due to the lack of a consensus about potential
dangers of trans fat. 140 “Thus, the FDA’s reading of section
101.13(i)(3)—that the regulation does not authorize ‘No Trans Fat’
[statements]—makes the most sense of the overall labeling
regime . . . .” 141 Accordingly, the claims should not be preempted.
The Ninth Circuit rejected several of the Defendant’s
arguments in Reid. The first theory rejected was that the “No
Trans Fat” statement outside of the nutritional label is the
equivalent of the 0 grams of trans fat per serving statement inside
the nutritional label. 142 The second theory was that the FDA allows
for reasonable synonyms of authorized nutrient content claims to
135. Id. at 962.
136. See id. (“The structure of FDA labeling regulations bolsters this
conclusion.”).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 963.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 962–63.
141. See id. at 963 (explaining this would give meaning to 21 C.F.R.
§ 101.62(b)-(c) (2016)).
142. Id.
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be placed on the label, as long as they are not misleading. 143 The
Defendant argued that the “No Trans Fat” claim was a reasonable
synonym. 144 The court refuted that argument by calling attention
to the fact that claims “like Benecol's ‘0 grams trans fat per serving’
claim [on the nutrition label], are not nutrient content claims and
thus are not covered by [the] synonym rule.” 145 The fact that
Benecol must state that it contains “0 grams of trans fat per
serving on its nutrition label makes no difference here” because the
nutrient content claims are at issue, not the nutritional label. 146
B. Third Circuit Decisions
In 2013, the Third Circuit in Young decided consumer class
action claims regarding trans fat nutrient content claims in
Benecol were preempted. 147 Young involved the same product that
was later at issue in the Reid case. At the District Court level in
Young the Plaintiff claimed that Benecol’s “No Trans Fatty Acids”
representations outside of the label were false and misleading as
the product contains small amounts of trans fat. 148 The Plaintiff
filed a complaint that included: violations of the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act, breach of express warranties, breach of the
implied covenant of merchantability, and unjust enrichment. 149
Johnson & Johnson’s motion to dismiss was granted by the District
Court. 150

143. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.13(b)(4) (2016) (“Reasonable variations in the
spelling of the terms defined in part 101 and their synonyms are permitted
provided these variations are not misleading.”).
144. See Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, 780 F.3d 952, 962–63 (9th Cir. 2015)
(discussing how a reasonable consumer would read the nutrient content claim).
145. Id. at 963.
146. See id. (explaining that required nutrition label claims can differ from
nutrition content claims).
147. See Young v. Johnson & Johnson, 525 F. App’x 179, 183–85 (3d Cir. 2013)
(stating that Young’s theories of liability were preempted and properly
dismissed).
148. See id. at 181 (listing the five-count complaint allegations).
149. Id.
150. See id. (stating that the District Court concluded that Young lacked
standing and Young’s claims were preempted).
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The two issues on which the court decided the motion to
dismiss were standing and preemption. 151 In order to satisfy the
constitutional minimum of standing, three elements must be
established by the plaintiff. 152 First, the plaintiff must have
suffered an “injury in fact.” 153 Injury in fact is defined as an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is “concrete and
particularized” and “actual or imminent,” not “conjectural or
hypothetical.” 154 The second element is a causal connection
between the injury in fact and the conduct complained of. 155 Last,
the injury must be “likely, as opposed to merely speculative” that
the injury will be redressed by a decision in favor of the plaintiff. 156
In Young the Plaintiff did not claim that he suffered any
adverse health problems from Benecol. 157 In fact, Plaintiff did not
claim that he consumed the product, but did claim he purchased
the product regularly over a “five-year period” of time. 158 Plaintiff’s
injury in fact was not satisfied in the eyes of the court because it
was determined to be an “apprehension about possible future
injury.” 159 For these reasons, the District Court determined the
Plaintiff lacked standing as injury-in-fact was not “adequately
pled.” 160
Another important factor in the eyes of the District Court was
that Benecol’s packaging did contain a disclosure regarding
partially hydrogenated oils and trans fat. 161 Thus, the substance of
Plaintiff’s complaint, which stated that Benecol’s health claims
were “false and misleading,” were arguably disclosed to him. The
disclosure stated in part, a small amount of “partially
151. Id.
152. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (listing
how courts have defined the requirement for establishing standing).
153. See id. at 560 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757 (1984)).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Young v. Johnson & Johnson, No. CIV.A. 11-4580 JAP, 2012 WL
1372286, at *2–*5 (D.N.J. Apr. 19, 2012) (stating that adverse health conditions
may help demonstrate an injury-in-fact).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Young v. Johnson & Johnson, 525 F. App’x 179, 181 (3d Cir. 2013).
161. See Young, 2012 WL 1372286, at *4 (discussing the importance of
disclosure while analyzing the injury-in-fact claim element).
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hydrogenated oils are used in Benecol . . . . As a result, Benecol
Spreads, contain an extremely low level of trans fat. The FDA
allows foods containing less than 0.5 grams of trans fat/serving to
be labeled 0 grams trans fat, since this is considered an
insignificant amount.” 162 With regards to the preemption issue, the
District Court concluded quickly that Plaintiff's claims regarding
Benecol’s statements were expressly preempted because they
sought to impose requirements that were “inconsistent” with
federal law. 163
On appeal, the Court of Appeals granted Young’s standing as
“tenuous” but decided to fully consider the case. 164 On the merits,
Young’s claims against Johnson & Johnson, were again
determined to be expressly preempted by the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act as amended by the Nutrition Labeling and Education
Act. 165 “The NLEA expressly preempts any state-imposed
requirement for nutrition labeling of food, or with respect to
nutritional or health-related claims, ‘that [are] not identical to the
requirement’ set forth in the relevant provisions of the Act.” 166
Young did not challenge that principle, but instead claimed his
state law causes of action regarding Johnson & Johnson’s alleged
misrepresentations are not preempted because they are identical
to those set forth in the NLEA. 167
Young maintained that “although the regulations authorize
Benecol to claim that it contains ‘0g of Trans Fat Per Serving,’ they
do not expressly permit a claim of ‘NO TRANS FAT’ for the product
as a whole.” 168 Young made the distinction in his opening brief that
he “seeks to prohibit false and misleading nutrient content claims
regarding trans fat content per product. Prohibition of such

162. Id. at *8.
163. Id. at *15.
164. See Young, 525 F. App’x at 182 n.4 (stating that Young’s specific facts
allowed the Court to review the merits).
165. Id. at 181.
166. Id. at 181–82.
167. See id. at 182 (arguing that the claims are identical to the NLEA, Young
asserts that his product contains no trans fats and the product has been proven
to reduce cholesterol).
168. Id. at 182.
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statements is not inconsistent with the FDA's regulation allowing
nutrient content claims about trans fat per serving.” 169
To further understand Young’s argument, below is a brief
overview of the FDA’s own opinion on nutrient content claims per
product versus per serving. First the FDA says that the distinction
between nutrient content claims per product and per serving is
necessary to understand and use the nutrition label correctly. 170
The FDA website explains the relationship between a serving size
and the whole package. 171 The explanation states, “[t]he size of the
serving on the food package influences the number of calories and
all the nutrient amounts listed on the top part of the label.” 172
Seeking to emphasize the distinction between a serving size in the
entire product, the FDA website goes on to say: “Pay attention to
the serving size, especially how many servings there are in the food
package. Then ask yourself, ‘How many servings am I consuming’?
(e.g., 1/2 serving, 1 serving, or more).” 173 The FDA also provides a
sample label on the website. 174 The accompanying description
states, “[i]n the sample label, one serving of macaroni and cheese
equals one cup. If you ate the whole package, you would
eat two cups. That doubles the calories and other nutrient
numbers, including the %Daily Values as shown in the sample
label.” 175 While that example used calories, the logic would remain
true for trans fat. Again, Young claims he sought to prohibit
misleading manufacturer statements pertaining to per product
representations, not trans fat statements per serving, which may
or may not be permitted by the FDA.

169.
170.

See id. (citing Brief for Appellant, Opening Br. at 25).
See How To Understand and Use the Nutrition Facts Label, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/LabelingNutrition/ucm2
74593.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (explaining that various factors help
determine the Nutrient Content label) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
171. See id. (discussing how serving size labels attempt to help consumers
understand how serving sizes and whole package sizes differ).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See id. (displaying a sample Nutrition Facts label and explaining how
consumers can properly analyze these Nutrition labels).
175. Id. (emphasis in original).
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See Figure 2 below for an example of a sample nutrition label
with a red circle around where Trans Fat would have been
indicated on these products. That number would then be
multiplied by the number of servings, this product has thirty-two
servings.

Figure 2 176
Before rebutting Young’s allegations regarding per product
claims, the Court of Appeals did admit that the FDA has
recognized the potential for a consumer to misinterpret that a
product is “free” of a nutrient such as trans fat, when a nutrient
content claim of 0 grams per serving is made. 177 In 1993, the FDA
176. See FDA Cuts Trans Fat in Processed Foods, supra note 47.
(“A variety of processed foods—including frozen, canned and baked goods—
contain trans fat. The amount per serving is listed on the Nutrition Facts
label . . . . The inclusion of partially hydrogenated oil in the list of ingredients is
another indication [of] trans fat.”).
177. See Young v. Johnson & Johnson, 525 F. App’x 179, 183 (3d Cir. 2013)
(stating that the requirement for disclosure may produce a potential for
discrepancy) (emphasis added).
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admitted that “[s]uch declarations could be confusing to
consumers, and this consequence is unintended. ‘Free’ claims are
different than claims such as ‘low,’ which do not create an
expectation in consumers' minds that the food bearing the claim
will possess a [specific] amount of the nutrient in question.” 178 In
an attempt to clear up this “misleading and confusing” labeling the
FDA decided that “the determination of whether a product is free
of a nutrient be based on the value of the nutrient . . . per labeled
serving.” 179 The court stated this decision was made in the interest
of “clarity and consistency” and because of that decision “FDA
regulations therefore authorize nutrient content claims based on
per serving amounts, even if those claims are not entirely accurate
on a per product basis.” 180
In support of this per serving position, the court examined
three regulations governing other substances which authorize
nutrient content claims that a food is “free” of a specific nutrient
when it contains low levels. 181 They include the authorization of
nutrient content claims that a food is calorie free when it contains
less than 5 calories per serving, claims that that a food is sodium
free if it contains less than 5 milligrams of sodium per serving and
claims that a food contains no fat or no saturated fat if it contains
less than 0.5 grams per serving. 182 Therefore, the court reasoned,
“the ‘NO TRANS FAT’ claim on the Benecol label is not
‘misleading’ as that term is used in [the regulation] and is
authorized . . . even if a ‘no trans fat’ claim is not expressly
contemplated by the regulations.” 183
In reaching the above decision the Third Circuit cited three
cases which had reached a similar conclusion. All three of those
cases were mentioned above, Carrea, Chacanaca, and Reid. 184
Interestingly the Third Circuit in Young cited the Reid decision
from the lower court which was ultimately overturned in favor of
178. See Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles,
Petitions, Definition of Terms, 58 Fed. Reg. 44020, 44025 (Aug. 18, 1993)
(discussing the unintended confusion from these declarations).
179. Id.
180. Young, 525 F. App’x at 183.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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the Plaintiff, and it was decided his claims were not preempted,
which brings the reasoning of the Third Circuit into question. 185
Two other cases relied on by the Third Circuit, Carrea and
Chacanaca, were also Ninth Circuit cases decided before the 2015
Reid case which determined claims were not preempted.
Nonetheless, the court concluded “[n]utrient content claim
regulations promulgated under the NLEA thus authorize the
Trans Fat Claims, based on the per serving amount of trans fats
that the product contains.” 186 The Court further reasoned
“[b]ecause Young seeks to bar that disclosure under state law, in
effect enforcing state law requirements that are not identical to the
NLEA, his action is expressly preempted as it relates to those
claims.” 187
C. Other Decisions Involving Trans Fat Misrepresentation
The facts in the below cases do not exactly parallel those of the
circuit split above, but the analysis sheds light on what might
happen if these courts were to face an issue more similar to the
circuit split.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois,
Eastern Division
Consumers claimed that The Quaker Oats Company lured
consumers into buying their products by “touting them as being
(among other things) ‘wholesome’ and ‘heart healthy,’ when in
reality the products contain unhealthy trans fats.” 188 Plaintiff
claimed that these products were misleading because its packaging
and marketing campaigns both state the product contains 0 grams
of trans fat. 189 The product actually contained up to 5 grams of
trans fat per box. 190 The central issue in this decision was whether
the consumers had established standing. 191 The court held that the
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1083.
Id. at 1083.
Id.
Id.
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injury-in-fact requirement was established because the consumers
paid more for these products than they would have, had they
known they were being subjected to health risks. 192
Quaker argued that because the consumers were not
physically harmed by the allegedly misleading product, they
lacked standing. 193 The court decided to follow a recent Seventh
Circuit decision, which stated that a lack of a physical harm to the
consumers does not mean that they lack standing, as financial
injury can create standing. “The plaintiffs’ loss is financial: they
paid more for the [the product] than they would have, had they
known of the risks [product] posed to [them].” 194 The court
determined the consumers’ claims were supportable due to the
allegedly misleading product packaging regarding the absence of
trans fat. 195
Immediate Consumption
Products that were ready for immediate consumption also
created diverging opinions about whether claims were
supportable. McDonald’s publishes the fat and calorie contents of
its products; this information is available in store and on the
company’s website. 196 Prior to February 8, 2006, McDonald’s stated
that its large fries contained six grams of trans fat. 197 On February
8, 2006, McDonald’s changed its position and stated that the large
fries actually contained eight grams of trans fat. 198 Plaintiff
consumers in Reyes maintained that they knew about the
McDonald’s representations prior to February 8, and claimed they
would have modified their McDonald’s fries consumption had they
known the correct information. 199 In order to state a claim under
the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, the
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1084.
194. See id. (quoting In re Aqua Dots Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 751 (7th
Cir. 2011)).
195. Id.
196. See Reyes v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 06 C 1604, 2006 WL 3253579, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2006) (describing the ways that McDonald’s made nutrition
information available to the public).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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Plaintiffs must allege that “(1) McDonald's is engaged in a
deceptive act or practice; (2) McDonald's intended that Plaintiffs
would rely on the deception; (3) the deception occurred in the
course of conduct involving trade and commerce; (4) Plaintiffs were
injured; and (5) conduct proximately caused Plaintiffs' injury.” 200
In Reyes the court ultimately determined that the Plaintiffs had
pled the elements sufficiently enough to survive a motion to
dismiss. 201
In 2007, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia dismissed a physician’s action against Yum! Brands, Inc.
where the physician claimed that KFC failed to reveal its use of
trans fat, holding that the physician did not state a claim
supported under any legal theory. 202 The physician stated in his
complaint that “KFC’s use of partially hydrogenated oil is
‘unnecessary,’ because healthier oils were available. KFC
advertises on its website that KFC products are part of a
nutritionally healthy lifestyle. The advertisements do not reveal
the use of trans fats.” 203 Additionally, the Plaintiff stated that
because of the FDA’s warnings about trans fat in 2004 and 2005,
he was trying to avoid trans fat, but KFC did not display any
warning about its food containing trans fat. 204 In its examination
of Plaintiff’s allegations, the court found the Plaintiff did not allege
that he had suffered any immediate ill effects, nor any other kind
of injury from the food he consumed. 205 After finding that the
Plaintiff failed to allege any kind of injury, the court determined
that Plaintiff lacked standing in this action. 206 The court stated
that the Plaintiff did plead economic injury but “[did] not specify
what ‘economic injury’ he has suffered, and none is evident from
the facts presented, even under the most charitable reading of the
complaint.” 207

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id. at *2.
Hoyte v. Yum! Brands, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 24, 26 (D.D.C. 2007).
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 28.
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The Court’s statement about a possible economic injury is
significant in that it suggests it may grant standing if the same
scenario was brought before it again. 208 If this Plaintiff were to
claim that he paid a higher price for KFC over other fast foods, the
outcome may have been different.
IV. Conclusion
There are four compelling reasons why the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation is the correct one. First, the warning letters issued
by the FDA plainly state that “No Trans Fat” is an unauthorized
nutrient content claim. The letters are not binding, but the Ninth
Circuit determined they were not clearly erroneous, and thus
history dictates they should be followed. Second, the cases relied
on by the Third Circuit in Young bring the foundation of their
analysis into question. The Third Circuit cited three Ninth Circuit
cases for the proposition that claims should be preempted. One of
the cases the Third Circuit relied on was the lower court’s decision
in Reid, which was overturned in 2015, stating claims are not
preempted. The other two cases, Carrea and Chacanaca, were
decided before the 2015 Reid decision. In fact, The Quaker Oats
Company paid $1.4 million to settle the formerly named
Chacanaca class action in 2014. 209 Third, the structure of FDA
labeling regulations show that the Defendant’s interpretation
would make several regulations redundant. As mentioned above,
it would be inconsistent for the FDA to use the same regulation for
Fat and Trans Fat claims because those two substances have been
given drastically different treatment. The reason these substances
have been given different treatment is because of a lack of scientific
information on trans fat.
Fourth, the Third Circuit mistakenly strays from the
simplicity that 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1) offers. 210 Section 343(a)(1)
states that a food product will be misbranded if its labeling is false
208. Id.
209. See In re Quaker Oats Labeling Litig., No. C 10-0502 RS, 2012 WL
1034532, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2012) (“In light of the consolidation, and the
withdrawal of named plaintiff Robert Chacanaca, plaintiffs’ unopposed request to
change the caption of this action to the form set out above is granted.”).
210. 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1) (2012).
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or misleading in any respect. Using that straightforward guideline,
Benecol’s nutrient content claim of “No Trans Fat” is undoubtedly
misleading because it contains trans fat. The Third Circuit cites
calories, sodium, and fat as examples of substances where
authorization was given to make nutrient content claims that a
food is “free” of a substance, when it in fact does contain small
amounts of it. What the Third Circuit fails to recognize is that
trans fat is substantially worse for human health than those
products, and has historically been treated differently than them.
The FDA in 2013 made a determination that partially
hydrogenated oils and trans fat were no longer generally
recognized as safe for any use in human food. 211 A substance given
that distinction should not be treated the same as calories or fat. 212
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Reid that nutrient content claims
such as “No Trans Fat” were not authorized, and thus claims are
not preempted under federal law, is the correct interpretation.
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